Abstract:

Version History: Special issue on EC ‘13. Preliminary version at arXiv:1111.5472 [cs.GT] (Nov. 2011).

Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players’ utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to nontruthfulness in some cases). In this work, we propose a new, general way of modeling privacy in players’ utility functions. Specifically, we only assume that if an outcome \({o}\) has the property that any report of player \({i}\) would have led to \({o}\) with approximately the same probability, then \({o}\) has a small privacy cost to player \({i}\). We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modeling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number \({n}\) of players increases, the social welfare achieved by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of \({n}\)).

Publisher's Version