%0 Journal Article
%J ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
%D 2016
%T Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy.
%A Yiling Chen
%A Stephen Chong
%A Ian A. Kash
%A Tal Moran
%A Salil P. Vadhan
%X Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from truthfulness; it is not incorporated in playersâ€™ utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to nontruthfulness in some cases). In this work, we propose a new, general way of modeling privacy in playersâ€™ utility functions. Specifically, we only assume that if an outcome *o* has the property that any report of player *i* would have led to *o* with approximately the same probability, then *o* has a small privacy cost to player *i*. We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modeling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number *n* of players increases, the social welfare achieved by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of *n*). Preliminary version on arXiv (2011).
%B ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
%V 4
%G eng
%U https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2905047.2892555
%N 3