@article {634281, title = {Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy}, journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation}, volume = {4}, number = {3}, year = {2016}, abstract = { Version History:\ Special issue on EC {\textquoteleft}13.\ Preliminary version at\ arXiv:1111.5472 [cs.GT]\ (Nov. 2011). Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players{\textquoteright} utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to nontruthfulness in some cases). In this work, we propose a new, general way of modeling privacy in players{\textquoteright} utility functions. Specifically, we only assume that if an outcome\ \({o}\)\ has the property that any report of player\ \({i}\)\ would have led to\ \({o}\)\ with approximately the same probability, then\ \({o}\)\ has a small privacy cost to player\ \({i}\). We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modeling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number\ \({n}\)\ of players increases, the social welfare achieved by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of\ \({n}\)). }, url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/2892555}, author = {Yiling Chen and Stephen Chong and Ian A. Kash and Tal Moran and Salil P. Vadhan} }